Abstract-In Interdomain Ingress Traffic Engineering (INITE), a "target" Autonomous System (AS) aims to control the ingress link through which the traffic of one or more upstream source networks flows to the target network or to its customers. Currently, there are few methodologies for systematic INITE. In practice, ISPs often attempt to manipulate, mostly in a trial-and-error manner, the AS-Path length attribute of upstream routes through a simple technique known as prepending (or padding). In this paper, we focus on prepending and propose a polynomial-time algorithm (referred to as OPV) that determines the optimal padding for an upstream route at each ingress link of the target network. Specifically, given a set of "elephant" source networks for a particular customer of the target network, and a set of maximum load constraints on the ingress links of the latter, OPV determines the minimum padding at each ingress link so that the load constraints are met, when it is feasible to do so. OPV requires as input an AS-Path length estimate from each source to each ingress link. We describe how to estimate this matrix, leveraging the BGP Looking Glass Servers that are abundant today for monitoring interdomain routing. To deal with unavoidable inaccuracies in the AS-Path length estimates, and also to compensate for the generally unknown BGP tie-breaking process in upstream networks, we develop a robust variation (RPV) of the OPV algorithm. We show that RPV manages to identify a padding vector that meets the given maximum load constraints, when it is feasible to do so, even in the presence of inaccurate AS-Path lengths and unknown BGP tie-breaking behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traffic Engineering (TE) refers to the design and implementation of controls that affect the flow of traffic in a network, or internetwork, to meet a performance objective. Typical objectives include load balancing across different links/paths, low delays, or meeting given capacity constraints. As opposed to packet scheduling and buffer management schemes, which operate in short time scales (less than a second), and infrastructure provisioning, which takes place in large time scales (days or longer), TE is a medium time scale operation (minutes to hours) and it often requires supervision from a human operator [1] . In relatively stable conditions, in terms of both routing changes and load variations, TE can be instrumental in improving network efficiency and robustness.
TE is broadly divided into two types: intradomain and interdomain. In intradomain TE, the operator of an Autonomous System (AS) controls the flow of traffic within that network by optimizing the link costs of the corresponding routing protocol (mostly OSPF or IS-IS), or through dynamic provisioning of virtual circuits (e.g., MPLS). For previous work in intradomain TE we refer the reader to [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] and to references therein. Intradomain TE assumes that the ingress and egress links of interdomain traffic flows are given as inputs, in the form of a traffic matrix, and they cannot be manipulated.
Interdomain TE, on the other hand, aims to control exactly those ingress and egress flows. Let us consider a "target" AS, referred to as . has a number of ingress links, receiving traffic from upstream ASes. If is not a stub network, traffic that is destined to one of that network's customers eventually leaves through an egress link. Controlling the egress link that the traffic will flow through is referred to as Interdomain Egress TE. On the other hand, controlling the ingress link through which the traffic of a source network will enter is referred to as Interdomain Ingress TE (INITE) .
Comparing the maturity, in terms of both operations and research, between INITE and the other types of TE, the former is much less deployed, understood, and trusted [7] , [8] . The high-level reason is that INITE requires that the target network has a way to affect BGP routing decisions in upstream ASes, without necessarily the active cooperation of those networks. In more detail, to perform INITE the operator of would face the following major unknowns about the upstream cloud, i.e., the part of the Internet between a source network and the ingress links of :
¡ the BGP policies, especially those expressed through the Local Preference BGP attribute and the ingress/egress routing filters deployed in the upstream cloud (note that the Local Preference attribute has the highest priority in the BGP route selection process), ¡ the actual AS-level topology of the upstream cloud, and in particular the AS-Path lengths from any upstream network to the ingress links, ¡ the BGP tie-breaking behavior of the upstream cloud, referring to the way a BGP speaker selects the best route among a set of candidate routes that have the same Local Preference and AS-Path length attributes in particular [9] , [10] , [11] .
To the previous unknowns, one has to include the more common challenges of any TE problem, including variations in the traffic loads, unexpected infrastructure events (e.g., router crashes), etc.
Given the previous difficulties, it is not surprising that some ISPs avoid INITE. One form of INITE that is, however, used by some ISPs is that of AS-Path prepending, or simply "prepending" (also known as AS-Path padding). The idea is very simple: the target network can make a route less attractive to its upstream ASes if it increases the AS-Path length of that route by adding several instances of its own AS-Number to that attribute. For instance, the AS-Path attribute ¢ 10£ , where 10 is the AS-Number of , can be modified to ¢ 10,10,10£ before the corresponding route is advertised upstream. Effectively, this increases the route length from 1 to 3 hops, and so it becomes less likely that the route will be selected from an upstream network [9] . A recent measurement study showed that 32% of the routes in the AT&T network have some form of prepending, with about 90% of the corresponding paths extended by 1-5 hops [8] . Prepending is often performed in an ad-hoc manner, especially when an ISP simply wants to make a route unusable unless if there is a failure in other routes. In some cases, operators increase the degree of padding by a trial-and-error basis, until the AS-Path is long enough to reduce the load of that ingress link by a certain amount.
Our objective is to investigate the prepending technique more thoroughly, and understand both its potential and limitations. As a first step, in this paper, we show how to perform INITE in a systematic and algorithmic way using AS-Path prepending. We consider upstream clouds in which the route selection is not affected by the Local Preference attribute, meaning that the BGP routes are determined by the AS-Path length. The problem that we consider, in its basic form, is the following. Suppose that a target network has ¤ ingress links. A major customer network is given ( = ¦ . We refer to the previous as the Constrained Optimal Prepending (COP) problem. COP, despite its simple statement, captures an important objective of ISPs, that of balancing the ingress load to a customer across a set of ingress links, and it attempts to leverage a currently used ad-hoc technique (prepending) in a more systematic methodology. Note that a trivial variation of COP is to consider all ingress traffic to , instead of the traffic to a customer ¥ ; this would be the case, for instance, if is a stub network.
The first contribution of this paper is to develop a polynomial-time algorithm, referred to as OPV (for Optimal Padding Vector), which solves the COP problem. The algorithm is very simple: at each iteration, an overloaded ingress link is chosen and its padding is incremented. Then, given the new padding vector algorithm, the mapping from sources to links is recomputed, and the algorithm moves to the next iteration.
A key input to the OPV algorithm is the AS-Path length matrix . The second contribution of the paper is to describe four estimation techniques for & , leveraging the abundant routing Looking Glass Servers that are present in the Internet today, and to evaluate their accuracy. Overall, we show empirically that in 60-65% of the cases the estimation error is zero, in 85-90% it is less than 2 1 hop, and in about 95% it is less than 2 2 hops. Also, larger errors tend to happen mostly in longer paths.
The previous AS-Path length estimation errors are not insignificant, given that most AS-Paths that we estimate are 3-6 hops. To deal with errors in & , our third contribution is to develop a Robust Padding Vector (RPV) algorithm. RPV is a heuristic built on top of OPV. The objective in RPV is to determine a padding vector that will probably satisfy the given maxload constraints, even if the input matrix & has inaccurate elements and even if we do not know the BGP tie-breaking behavior in the upstream cloud. Simulation results show that, with the empirical error distribution in & that we observe, and with completely unknown tie-breaking behavior, RPV can still find a padding vector that satisfies the maxload constraints in more than 90% of the cases, as long as such a padding vector exists.
The paper is structured as follows. In II, we describe COP more formally, and state the key underlying assumptions. In 3 III, we propose and study the OPV algorithm, proving that it finds the optimal padding vector in polynomial time. In 3 IV, we describe how to estimate the ASPath length matrix and evaluate the accuracy of the proposed techniques. In 3 V, we present the RPV algorithm and evaluate its robustness through simulations. The related work in the context of interdomain TE is discussed in 3 VI. We conclude in 3 VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FORMULATION
In this section, we first describe the COP problem more formally, state the formulation's key assumptions, and make some remarks regarding related operational issues.
A. COP Problem Statement
Consider a target network that aims to do INITE through prepending (see Figure 1) The effectiveness of any AS-Path prepending technique, including ours, is limited by the use of local routing policies expressed through the Local Preference attribute. The reason is that the Local Preference attribute has a higher priority in the BGP path selection process than the AS-Path length (see Table II ). Consider a source Figure 2 . In the following, we assume that the branching nodes of this tree do not select their best routes to the N ingress links based on Local Preference. In other words, the candidate routes for at each branching node of C are assigned the same Local Preference value. The design of automated ways for examining the previous assumption is an important task for future work. One of the key parameter is the BGP tie-breaking behavior in the upstream cloud. As shown in Table II teria; such a task would be extremely difficult and errorprone. We assume however that the tie-breaking behavior is determined by a matrix is completely and accurately known. , and selects that route. This means that
is the length of the shortest ASPath from
Case-1:
) receives the route to
, and so 
, where the equality is broken in favor of that other path. Then,
, which again contradicts (1).
Based on the previous Lemma, we can now define the link assignment vector
, where
is the link 0 that source ) selects based on (1). From the link assignment vector
, the expected load at an ingress link
The vector is infeasible. The reasoning behind the previous optimality objective is to avoid unnecessary padding, given that excessive padding in practice sometimes triggers upstream route filtering.
Example 1 illustrates the COP problem.
Without prepending:
Link 1 is overloaded.
Acceptable padding vector. Example 1
B. Remarks
Together with the previously mentioned assumptions, we also make the following assumptions regarding operational issues that may be relevant in practice: ¡ The destination network ¥ is a customer of only, so there is no way that prepending in can shift the traffic away from to a different provider. For multihomed destinations, our techniques would still apply as long as is the primary provider, and any secondary providers of ¥ are used only as a backup. Moreover, with a small modification, our algorithm can also solve the case that ¥ is multihomed, which will be explained later in this paper.
¡
The time scales in which adjusts its padding vectors are relatively short compared to the time scales in which the routes from the source networks to ¥ change. Previous work has shown that BGP routes of major traffic sources tend to be stable for days or weeks [12] . ¡ Some ISPs have an agreement with their peers that they will announce the same AS-Path to a certain destination through all their peering links. If that is the case, can group together all ingress links to each peer, and then apply the proposed algorithms at the level of link groups.
III. OPTIMAL PADDING VECTOR ALGORITHM
In this section, we first present the OPV algorithm, and then prove that it can determine the optimal padding vector # , when the given instance F is feasible, in polynomial time. (4) and (5) 2:
A. Optimal Padding Vector (OPV) algorithm
Identify an overloaded link 
and
Note that AE can be computed in polynomial time, as shown in Lemma III.3.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, a minor change can make the algorithm applicable on multihomed network . Thus, will not "overprepend" the path so that it pushes the traffic to other providers of ¥ . We prove later in this section two important properties of OPV. First, when 
B. Properties of the OPV algorithm
The following lemma proves that, with a feasible instance, the optimal padding vector # has at least one zero element.
Lemma III.1: Suppose that the instance . Construct a padding vector
is also acceptable. But , then the link Ô will not be overloaded in any subsequent iteration, and so its padding element will remain at
Iteration 0:
Link 1 is overloaded; increment Á | .
Iteration 1:
Link 1 is overloaded; increment Á .
Iteration 2:
Link 3 is overloaded; increment Á ò .
Iteration 3:
No overloaded links. 
where the case of equality is broken in favor of link Ô through the G matrix, and so
In the optimal vector
From (6) and (7) 
, which contradicts our earlier assumption.
The following lemma shows that, for a feasible instance, each optimal padding element is upper bounded by a certain function of the AS-Path length matrix that can be computed in polynomial time.
Lemma 
where all ties (equalities) are broken in favor of link , and so 
The following theorem gives the main result for the OPV algorithm in the case of infeasible instances.
Theorem III.5: If instance F is infeasible, then the OPV algorithm detects that there is no acceptable padding vector in polynomial time.
Proof: Note that the OPV algorithm fails to find an acceptable padding vector after AE iterations, it exits reporting that the instance is infeasible. If 
IV. ESTIMATION OF INPUT PARAMETERS
In this section, we discuss the two key unknown inputs of the OPV algorithm, namely the set of super-source networks and the corresponding source load vector . Also, the maxload vector is supposed to be known given that it is chosen by the target network operator.
A. Selection of super-sources
We assume that the ingress routers of collect statistics (with Cisco's NetFlow for instance) of the arriving traffic, aggregated by source network; this is a common requirement for any type of traffic engineering. Because there may be too many source networks for a given customer ¥ , or because those networks may not be in upstream clouds, can map one or more large sources of traffic to a single super-source . The requirement is that has to be in the AS-Path from the actual source networks to any ingress link of .
To examine the former requirement, can use AS-level topology maps, constructed with multiple vantage points as described in [13] . For example, the NetFlow data may show that several major sources of traffic for ¥ belong to three stub ASes that are all customers of a regional or tier-2 provider AS-X, and that those three stub networks are not multi-homed (i.e., they can only reach through AS-X). In that case, AS-X can be considered as a super-source LGS's are abundant in the Internet today, providing a "peek" inside a network's BGP routing tables. They are mostly used by ISPs for problem diagnosis and monitoring of interdomain routing. The publicly available LGS's that are listed in www.traceroute.org include 273 servers that in some cases provide access to multiple routers within an AS [14] . It is likely however that major ISPs have private access to even more LGS's in remote networks, to accommodate synergistic problem diagnosis. 
B. Estimation of AS-Path length matrix

Recall that
1) LGS in )
: The source network ) may include an LGS. This is the ideal case, and it leads to the most accurate estimation. In the example of Figure 3 , AS1 is a source network that deploys an LGS.
can just query that LGS for the AS-Path to each wayfinding prefix.
2)
LGS in a customer of
Here, a customer of ) deploys an LGS. In that case, can query that LGS for each wayfinding prefix, and then remove from the returned ASPaths the part that includes that customer AS. In Figure 3 , AS4 is a customer of the source network AS5. AS4 deploys an LGS.
3) LGS in the path from to )
: Another possibility is that can locate an LGS in a network in the reverse path, from to ) . In Figure 3 , AS7 is a source network and AS8 is a network deploying an LGS in the reverse path. In that case, can estimate the AS-Path length . That reverse path is of course directly available from the border router at 0 . The problem with this technique is that it relies on the symmetry of the forward and reverse AS-Paths, which is often not the case in the Internet. On the positive side, the technique still produces a correct estimate if the two paths have the same length, even if those paths are different. This case is represented in the path between and AS11 in Figure 3 .
AS-Path length distribution and estimation errors: The first two of the four previous techniques would give no estimation errors, because the corresponding LGS's report directly the AS-Path from the source to the ingress links of the target network.
The third and fourth techniques, on the other hand, depend on the symmetry assumption, and they will probably suffer from estimation errors. To quantify these errors, we used 79 of the publicly available LGS's listed at [14] . We estimated the AS-Path length from every LGS to each of the 78 other LGS's using the previous two techniques: "LGS in the reverse path" (when applicable), and "reverse path estimation" (always applicable). Then, we compared each AS-Path length estimate with the length of the actual AS-Path, as that was reported in the remote LGS. Figure 4 shows the empirical probability density function for the estimated AS-Path lengths. Note that about 90-95% of the paths are up to 6 AS hops, including any prepending, while 60% of the paths are either 4 or 5 hops.
The unconditional estimation error for the previous two estimation techniques is as follows: 60-65% of the esti- , where Í is the actual AS-Path length. The conditional probability that an estimate is error-free if © Í is 3 or 4 hops is 78% and 70%, respectively, which is higher than the corresponding unconditional accuracy. Similarly, the conditional probability that an estimate has an error of less than
is 5 or 6 hops is 88% and 86%, respectively. We use this empirical error distribution, as well as the AS-Path length distribution of Figure 4 , in the robustness study of the next section.
V. ROBUST PADDING VECTOR ALGORITHM
The previous section showed that the estimate of the AS-Path length matrix & may include errors, and it gave us an empirical distribution for the estimation error probability. In this section, we first describe an algorithm that aims to determine a robust padding vector in the presence of these errors, and then evaluate the effectiveness of that algorithm with simulations.
A. Robust Padding Vector Algorithm
Recall that an instance . Errors that correspond to small sources (relative to the rest of the sources) may not have an impact on the resulting padding vector.
Second, RPV generates a large subset of that includes instances. The fraction of feasible instances in is the feasibility index of . If is sufficiently large, the feasibility index estimates the probability that the actual instance F is feasible. , conditioned on the fact that the latter is feasible.
Eventually, RPV reports the padding vector Ì # with the maximum robustness index. The reason is that that vector maximizes the likelihood that it will be acceptable for
The higher is, the more samples we collect from the space of possible instances, and so the more reliable our robustness index will be. The robustness, on the other hand, can be increased if we increase .
B. Robustness evaluation
We evaluate the robustness of the padding vector that RPV reports using simulations. In the following, we consider a target network with 
& represents well the tightness of the given resource allocation problem for the homogeneous maxload constraints that we consider, and of course it should be less than 100% for any instance to be feasible. To achieve a certain load . The CDF curves that are not visible in the graphs are equal to 100% for all instances.
Note that even with the Uniform distribution for 5 , which is the most likely among the three to produce feasible instances, the feasibility index drops below 90% when & is 0.7 (Fig 5(a) ). For the heavy-tailed Pareto sources, the feasibility is often below 90% even when & =0.6 ( Fig  5(c) ). The feasibility could be even lower if we had simulated non-homogeneous maxload constraints across different links. Figure 5 shows that the robustness index of the padding vector that RPV reports is larger than 90% for all three load conditions, with both the Uniform and Exponential distributions. With the Pareto distribution, on the other hand, the robustness can be lower than 90% in 10-20% of the cases, but rarely lower than 80% (Fig 5(f) ). Note that a higher load & does not necessarily mean a lower robustness index. The reason is that the latter is conditioned on feasible instances only. It can happen that even though the feasibility index is low, a large number of padding vectors are acceptable for the few feasible instances.
The overall conclusion from these results is that RPV can produce a robust padding vector Ì # , in the sense that that vector will be acceptable for the actual instance to be feasible with a high probability however, say more than 90%, the load metric & should be below 50-70%, depending on the distribution of 5 , at least for the homogeneous maxload constraints that we simulated here.
VI. RELATED WORK
An excellent survey for interdomain TE appears in [7] . The authors explain why INITE is harder than other types of TE. They also summarize the main methods to perform INITE, namely selective/different advertisements (or advertisement of more specific prefixes) on different peering links, AS-Path prepending, use of the MED attribute in ASes that have multiple peering links, and use of various BGP communities to signal TE decisions between different ASes.
The feasibility of interdomain TE by a stub AS was examined in [15] (without considering a particular TE mechanism). That work concluded that, despite the important variability of interdomain flows, it would be useful for a stub AS to engineer its ingress traffic, aggregated at an appropriate level. In a follow-up work, based on more recent measurements, the authors made more pessimistic conclusions regarding the feasibility of interdomain traffic engineering [16] . At least for their UCL and PSC traces (both stub networks), they showed that there was significant temporal variability in the traffic carried by each major AS path. Furthermore, due to limited aggregation at the AS level, they argued that to effectively control ingress traffic one would need to affect the route selection in a large number of ASes. The use of the BGP community attribute for INITE has been studied in depth in [17] . The authors presented various drawbacks of using that attribute: the requirement for a manually encoded filter for each supported community, the fact that each AS must advertise the semantics of its own community values to peers, and the transitivity of that attribute. They proposed the use of a new standardized form of extended community, referred to as "redistribution community", which supports the following actions (among others): the attached route should not be announced, or it should be announced only to specific BGP speakers, and that the attached route should be prepended a number of times when announced to specific peers.
The Internet Draft [18] proposes a community, referred to as BGP PCC, that carries another community to be attached to a route, when the latter is sent to a distant AS. The PCC value, viewed as a tuple (AS-X, AS-Y, c), represents a request directed from the originating AS to AS-X to send community c to AS-Y when the associated route is sent from AS-X to AS-Y. The PCC community can be used for INITE, by allowing an originating AS to affect the route selection process in a remote AS.
Instead of adding extensions to BGP, Agarwal et al. proposed an Overlay Policy Control Architecture (OPCA) [19] . A major motivation behind OPCA is to support INITE. OPCA is basically an overlay network running on top of BGP to facilitate policy exchanges between ASes. It consists of a set of policy agents deployed in the participating ASes that communicate through an overlay protocol to process external policy announcements and negotiate with remote ASes the selection of interdomain paths for ingress traffic.
Feamster et al. focused on egress interdomain TE [8] . They showed how to move traffic in a predictable fashion by tuning certain BGP policies, and also how to limit the influence of neighboring domains on the local path selection process through BGP policies. That work includes measurements (from the AT&T network) for the frequency and extent of AS-Path prepending: 32% of the routes have some form or prepending, with about 90% of the corresponding paths extended by 1-5 hops, while the maximum prepending was 16 hops.
Uhlig et al. also focused on egress interdomain TE in [20] . They modeled the egress TE problem as follows: given Bressoud and Rastogi examined the intradomain problem of choosing the optimal set of border routers for the advertisement of a set of routes from a transit provider. The objective is to minimize the cost of traffic across that provider while meeting certain capacity constraints at the border routers [21] . The mathematical formulation of that work has some similarities with our formulation. Note however that the problem considered in [21] , which is a variation of the Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP), is NP-Hard, while COP can be solved in polynomial time. The reason is that the mapping of sources to links is more constrained in COP than in GAP.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
INITE is challenging mostly because it requires that an AS is able to affect BGP routing decisions in remote ASes. Previous research proposals in this area have focused on the use of special BGP communities, which require active cooperation from the upstream ASes. In practice, ISPs have been using AS-Path prepending to control the flow of ingress traffic. Prepending is widely viewed, however, as an ad-hoc technique and it has not received much attention in the related literature. In this work, we made a first step to explore the use of prepending in a more algorithmic framework, and to explore its potential and limitations.
The main contribution of this paper at the more theoretical level is to present a polynomial-time algorithm (OPV) that can determine the optimal padding vector given constraints on the maximum load of each ingress link. Even though OPV relies on accurate information of several parameters that can only be roughly estimated in practice, it is still important because it provides the best-case scenario for the effectiveness of prepending if all the required information was available. At the more practical level, the contribution of the paper is to describe how to apply prepending in a robust manner, considering that the AS-Path length information may be subject to estimation errors and the tie-breaking behavior is unknown. Interestingly, our simulations show that it is possible to determine an acceptable padding vector in that case as well, as long as the maximum load constraints are not too tight.
The greatest limitation of AS-Path prepending, and consequently of our work, is that prepending can affect the route selection process only if the upstream ASes do not use the Local Preference attribute to enforce policy decisions. It remains an open issue whether ISPs can identify branching nodes with restrained usage of Local Preference values in their upstream clouds in a simple and accurate manner. When that is the case, however, we believe that the results in this paper can be used to guide the prepending process in a systematic and more wellunderstood manner.
